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In this paper we investigate the set of correlated equilibria of bimatrix games. These
equilibria are interesting, because they can result in outcome proles that are not feasible
as a result of Nash equilibria. After giving an example to illustrate the various concepts,
we present a Projection Theorem which relates the two types of equilibria. Some lemmas
are provided to clarify and extend this theorem.
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1. Introduction
In certain classes of strategic games the players have partially common interests
and they may fear that \just playing a Nash equilibrium" does not do justice to
the common interests. In such games it may be wise to introduce a cooperative
pre-play meeting to coordinate the actions of the dierent players. The concept of
correlated equilibrium is based on this idea (see Aumann (1974, 1987)). It gives a
method to coordinate the actions of the players before the game is played.
The idea is shown in the following: in the pre-play meeting the players agree
upon a probability space (with a nite number of outcomes) and for each player
a signalling function on the outcome space. When the game is played, a chance
mechanism with the agreed probability measure determines an outcome (out of the
reach of any player) and each player gets a signal according to his own signalling
function. Next, each player chooses an action in his action space and the payos
follow. The dierence with playing the original strategic game is that the players
can react to the signal they get.
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During the pre-play meeting the players transform the strategic game into a
Bayesian game. A Bayesian equilibrium of the extended game is called a correlated
equilibrium of the strategic game. Note that the signal is costless and is only used
to coordinate the actions.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) show that if we start with an arbitrary Bayesian
equilibrium, we can construct another one by choosing the set of all pure strategy
proles as the outcome space and for each player the signalling function assigning
to every strategy prole his own component, which generates the same outcome as
the original one. As the chance distribution over the set of pure strategy proles is
the only thing that matters, the players do not need fancy chance mechanisms and
signalling functions. So, the set of correlated equilibria consists of all probability
measures on the set of pure strategy proles for which the reaction functions \fol-
lowing the advice you get" form a Bayesian equilibrium. Note that if \following the
advice you get" is optimal for every player, the eventual payos to the players are
fully determined by the agreed probability distribution. So, the discussion during
the pre-play meeting is about the outcome.
In the recent literature, there has been some interest in the relations between
Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria. For example, Evangelista and Raghavan
(1996) prove that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is also an extreme
point of the set of correlated equilibria. The same result is shown in Canovas et al.
(1999), who in addition pays special attention to completely mixed Nash equilibria.
Most of this literature, however, is not concerned with the corresponding payos
to the players. In this paper, we provide a Projection Theorem for bimatrix games,
which gives necessary and sucient conditions for a projected Nash equilibrium to
be a correlated equilibrium. An important feature of this theorem is that it yields
a correlated equilibrium in which the payos to the players are higher than in
the original Nash equilibrium. In case the original Nash equilibrium is completely
mixed, some stronger results are obtained.
This paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce some basic notation
and basic denitions. An introduction to correlated equilibria in bimatrix games is
given in Sec. 3. After an example in Sec. 4, we state our Projection Theorem in
Sec. 5, followed by a number of lemmas.
2. Notation and Basic Denitions
Let K 6= ; be a nite set. Denote
K =
(
x 2 RK
8i2K : xi  0;X
i2K
xi = 1
)
and for x 2 RK , denote CK(x) = fi 2 Kjxi 6= 0g. Let ei;K denote the ith canonical
unit vector in RK for every i 2 K.
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For x 2 RK ; x  0 and S $ CK(x), dene x−S 2 RK by
x−Si =
8><>:
0 if i 2 S ;
xi
P
j2K xjP
j2KnS xj
if i 2 KnS ; (2.1)
for all i 2 K.
Throughout this paper, let M;N denote the nite action spaces of player 1 and
2, respectively. We assume jM j > 1; jN j > 1. A bimatrix game is denoted by (A;B)
where A;B 2 RMN are the payo matrices of player 1 and 2, respectively. The
expected payo when the mixed strategy prole (p; q) 2 M N is played equals
p>Aq for player 1 and p>Bq for player 2.
For D 2 RMN , denote by Dk the kth row of matrix D and by D‘ the ‘th
column of D.
We dene player 1’s best-reply correspondence B1 : 
N  M , which assigns
to every mixed strategy of player 2 the subset of M that gives player 1 maximal
payo: B1(q) = arg maxp2M p>Aq for all q 2 N . Similarly, player 2’s best-reply
correspondence B2 : 
M  N is dened by B2(p) = arg maxq2N p>Bq for all
p 2 M . A strategy combination (p; q) 2 M N is called a Nash equilibrium
if p 2 B1(q) and q 2 B2(p). We denote the set of all Nash equilibria of a game
(A;B) by NE(A;B). A fundamental result in game theory (Nash (1951)) states
that for every A, B 2 RMN the set NE(A;B) is nonempty.
3. Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
A correlated strategy is a probability distribution  2 MN over the set of all
pure strategy proles, i.e., a matrix  2 RMN that satises
8i2M;j2N : ij  0 (3.1)
and X
(i;j)2MN
ij = 1 : (3.2)
A correlated strategy is implemented in the following way:
(1) An arbiter, who is not a player himself, draws an element x = (i; j) 2 M N
according to the probability distribution .
(2) The arbiter tells player 1 which row i has been drawn and player 2 which column
j has been drawn.
(3) Knowing the distribution  and knowing the information the arbiter has given
him about the realisation of x, each player chooses a (mixed) strategy from his
strategy space.
(4) The payo to each player is determined by his expected payo, as in the mixed
extension of the game.
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A correlated strategy  is a correlated equilibrium if in the third stage, the expected
payo of player 1 is maximal when he plays row i with probability 1 for all possible
realisations of i:
8i;k2M : iA>i  iA>k (3.3)
and similarly, if the expected payo of player 2 is maximal when he plays column
j with probability 1 for all realisations of j:
8j;‘2N : >jBj  >jB‘ : (3.4)
In other words, a correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy in which for each
realisation of the random draw by the arbiter, playing the row or column the arbiter
\advises" is incentive compatible for both players. We denote the set of correlated
equilibria of a game (A;B) by CE(A;B)  MN .
The set of correlated equilibria is the solution set of the system of linear inequal-
ities (3.1){(3.4). Hence, it is a convex polytope in the (jM  N j − 1)-dimensional
space MN . Lemma 3.1, which follows from Lemma 1 on page 197 in Moulin
(1986), shows that Nash equilibria \are" in fact correlated equilibria.
Lemma 3.1. Let p 2 M ; q 2 N . Then (p; q) 2 NE(A;B) if and only if pq> 2
CE(A;B).
Proof. Dene  = pq>. By construction,  satises (3.1) and (3.2). Next, let
i; k 2 M . Substituting i‘ = piq‘ and k‘ = pkq‘, (3.3) can be rewritten as
piAiq  piAkq, which holds if and only if pi = 0 orAiq  Akq. Because k is chosen
arbitrarily, we nd that the incentive compatibility constraints corresponding to row
i are satised if and only if this row is played with probability zero whenever it is
not a pure best response to q. Hence, (3.3) is equivalent to p 2 B1(q). Similarly,
(3.4) holds if and only if q 2 B2(p). From this the assertion follows.
We know that NE(A;B) need not be convex, so there are matricesA and B such
that the set of correlated equilibria, as being a convex polytope containing the set
of Nash equilibria, is strictly larger than the set of Nash equilibria. Therefore, the
concept of correlated equilibrium is a coarsening of the concept of Nash equilibrium.
4. Example
To illustrate the concepts of correlated equilibrium and projection, we present an
example of a 2 2 bimatrix game, which is taken from Aumann (1974).
The game (A;B), with jM j = jN j = 2, is determined by the following payo
matrices of player 1 and 2, respectively:
A =
"
6 2
7 0
#
; B =
"
6 7
2 0
#
:
November 29, 2002 10:20 WSPC/151-IGTR 00077
A Relation Between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria 409
This game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, namely ((1; 0); (0; 1)) and
((0; 1); (1; 0)), and one equilibrium in mixed strategies, namely ((23 ;
1
3 ); (
2
3 ;
1
3 )). The
set of correlated equilibria can be found by solving the system of linear inequalities
(3.1){(3.4), which results in:
CE(A;B) = Conv
("
0 1
0 0
#
;
"
0 0
1 0
#
;
"
4
9
2
9
2
9
1
9
#
;
"
1
2
1
4
1
4 0
#
;
"
0 25
2
5
1
5
#)
:
The rst three extreme points of CE(A;B) correspond to the Nash equilibria, while
the two other ones are projections of the completely mixed equilibrium. This exam-
ple illustrates two known results concerning the extreme points of CE(A;B): every
extreme point of a maximal Nash set is also an extreme point of the set of corre-
lated equilibria (Evangelista and Raghavan (1996) and Canovas et al. (1999)) and
in 22 bimatrix games, CE(A;B) 6= ConvfNE(A;B)g if and only if jNE(A;B)j = 3
(Peeters and Potters (1999)).
The payo proles that correspond to the three Nash equilibria are (2; 7), (7; 2)
and (143 ;
14
3 ), whereas the fourth extreme point of CE(A;B) has a payo prole of
(214 ;
21
4 ). We conclude that, in this example, players can improve upon the ecient
payo proles that result from the Nash equilibria by correlating their actions.
In Fig. 1, we depict the set of correlated equilibria in MN , which is a tetrahe-
dron. The three extreme points of CE(A;B) that correspond to the Nash equilibria
are represented by bullets. The two pure equilibria are corner points of the tetrahe-
dron, i.e., extreme points of MN , while the completely mixed equilibrium lies in
the interior. The two other extreme points of CE(A;B) are represented by circles
and lie on the faces containing both pure Nash equilibria.
The two extreme points of CE(A;B) that do not correspond to the Nash equilib-
ria are projections of the completely mixed equilibrium. The extreme point on the
back face in Fig. 1 lies on the line through the front corner of the tetrahedron and
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Fig. 1. Correlated equilibria in MN .
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the completely mixed equilibrium. Similarly, the extreme point on the front-right
face lies on the line through the left corner and the completely mixed equilibrium.
Such a projection onto a face of the tetrahedron is the geometric equivalent of the
Bayesian updating that was discussed in Sec. 1.
5. Projection
In this section we establish under which circumstances we can obtain a correlated
equilibrium by projecting a Nash equilibrium (\creating zeroes"). Our main result
will be the Projection Theorem, which gives necessary and sucient conditions
for creating a zero. In addition, we will prove some lemmas to further clarify this
theorem and to extend it towards creating multiple zeroes.
We start with the Projection Theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Projection Theorem). Let (p; q) 2 NE(A;B) be such that
jCM (p)j > 1 and jCN (q)j > 1 and let (i0; j0) 2 CM (p)  CN (q). Then
(pq>)−f(i0;j0)g 2 CE(A;B) if and only if ei0;M 2 B1(q−fj0g) and ej0;N 2
B2(p
−fi0g).
Proof. Dene  = pq>, 0 = −f(i0;j0)g and  = (1−i0j0)−1.
\(" Assume ei0;M 2 B1(q−fj0g) and ej0;N 2 B2(p−fi0g). By construction, 0
satises (3.1) and (3.2). Let i 2M and k 2Mnfig. We check (3.3) by distinguishing
between two cases.
(1) Suppose i = i0. We have 
0
i(Ai − Ak)> =
P
‘2CN (q)nfj0g
0
i‘(Ai‘ − Ak‘) =

P
‘2CN(q)nfj0gi‘(Ai‘ − Ak‘) = pi
P
‘2CN (q)nfj0g q‘(Ai‘ − Ak‘)  0, where
the inequality follows from ei0;M 2 B1(q−fj0g).
(2) Suppose i 6= i0. 0i(Ai − Ak)> = i(Ai − Ak)>  0, because (p; q) 2
NE(A;B).
From (1) and (2) we conclude that for all i; k 2 M we have 0iA>i  0iA>k,
so the incentive compatibility constraints of player 1, (3.3), are satised. Analo-
gously, by interchanging the roles of the players, player 2’s incentive compatibility
constraints, (3.4), are satised as well. Hence, 0 2 CE(A;B).
\)" Assume 0 2 CE(A;B). Then for all k 2 Mnfi0g we have 0i0(Ai0 −
Ak)>  0, which is equivalent to pi0
P
‘2CN (q)nfj0g q‘(Ai0‘ − Ak‘)  0. Because
pi0 > 0, this implies e
i0;M 2 B1(q−fj0g). In a similar manner, ej0;N 2 B2(p−fi0g)
is also satised.
Remark 5.1. If (p; q) is a completely mixed equilibrium, that is (p; q) 2
NE(A;B) = f(p; q) 2 NE(A;B)jCM (p) = M;CN (q) = Ng, then i(Ai−Ak)> =
0 for all i; k 2M . In this case, it follows from (1) of the \(" part of the proof that
0 − satises the incentive compatibility constraints (3.3) and (3.4). This means
that the projected correlated equilibrium is in a sense \more" incentive compatible
than the original Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 5.1 gives necessary and sucient conditions for creating a zero in terms
of best-replies. In order to reformulate these conditions, we need to introduce the
notion of carrier-restricted best-reply correspondence. For all p 2 M and q 2 N ,
we dene B1 (q; p) = arg maxp02M ;CM(p0)CM(p)(p0)>Aq to be the carrier-restricted
best-reply of player 1 against q, where he is only allowed to use those pure strategies
that are played with positive probability according to p. B2 (p; q) is dened in a
similar manner.
The next lemma states that the conditions ei0;M 2 B1(q−fj0g) and ej0;N 2
B2(p
−fi0g) in Theorem 5.1 are satised if and only if the pure strategy combination
(i0; j0) consists of \mutually worst responses", i.e., i0 gives player 1 the lowest
possible payo against j0 within the carrier of p and j0 gives player 2 the lowest
possible payo against i0 within the carrier of q.
Lemma 5.1. Let (p; q) 2 NE(A;B) with jCN (q)j > 1 and let (i; j) 2 CM (p) 
CN (q), then ei;M 2 B1(q−fjg; p) if and only if (ei;M )>Aej;N  (ek;M )>Aej;N for
all k 2 CM (p).
Proof. \)" Assume ei;M 2 B1(q−fjg; p) and suppose there exists a k 2 CM (p)
such that (ei;M )>Aej;N > (ek;M )>Aej;N . Then (ei;M )>Aq = qj(ei;M)>Aej;N +(1−
qj)(e
i;M )>Aq−fjg > qj(ek;M )>Aej;N + (1− qj)(ei;M )>Aq−fjg  qj(ek;M )>Aej;N +
(1−qj)(ek;M )>Aq−fjg = (ek;M )>Aq. But then p =2 B1(q), because player 1 is better
o playing ek;M with probability zero. Hence, (p; q) =2 NE(A;B). Contradiction.
\(" Assume (ei;M)>Aej;N  (ek;M )>Aej;N for all k 2 CM (p). Dene
 = (1 − qj)−1 and let k 2 CM (p). Because (p; q) 2 NE(A;B), we must
have that (ei;M )>Aq = (ek;M )>Aq. Then (ei;M )>Aq−fjg = ((ei;M )>Aq −
qj(e
i;M )>Aej;N ) = ((ek;M )>Aq − qj(ei;M)>Aej;N )  ((ek;M )>Aq −
qj(e
k;M )>Aej;N ) = (ek;M )>Aq−fjg. Hence, ei;M 2 B1 (q−fjg; p).
Of course, a similar result can be obtained for player 2. Note that Lemma 5.1
need not hold if we take the strategy spaceB1(q
−fjg) instead of the carrier-restricted
one B1 (q−fjg; p). Therefore, from now on we will only consider bimatrix games that
possess a completely mixed Nash equilibrium.
We now have easy conditions to check whether creating a zero in a probability
matrix representing a Nash equilibrium yields a correlated equilibrium. The next
step is to show that if we are allowed to create zeroes at a number of positions
separately, creating zeroes at these positions simultaneously yields yet another cor-
related equilibrium.
Lemma 5.2. Let (p; q) 2 NE(A;B) and let I $ M  N; I 6= ;. If (pq>)−fug 2
CE(A;B) for all u 2 I; then (pq>)−I 2 CE(A;B).
Proof. Assume (pq>)−fug 2 CE(A;B) for all u 2 I. Dene  = pq>, 0 = −I
and  = 1−Pu2I u. By construction, 0 satises (3.1) and (3.2). To check (3.3)
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and (3.4), we use the following relation:
0 = −1
X
u2I
(1−u)(−fug −) +  : (5.1)
By Remark 5.1, each of the (−fug − ) satises (3.3) and (3.4). The probability
matrix  corresponds to a Nash equilibrium and therefore also satises the incen-
tive compatibility constraints. Because 0 is a positive linear combination of these
matrices, it must satisfy (3.3) and (3.4) as well. Hence, 0 2 CE(A;B).
When investigating how to project a particular Nash equilibrium, we have to
take the incentive compatibility constraints of both players into account. However,
if we create an entire row of zeroes, the incentive compatibility constraint corre-
sponding to that row will be trivially satised. Hence, if we want to create an entire
row of zeroes, we only have to look at the incentive compatibility constraints of
player 2, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5.3. Let (p; q) 2 NE(A;B). Let i 2M . If ej;N 2 B2(p−fig) for all j 2 N;
then (p−figq>) 2 CE(A;B).
Proof. Assume ej;N 2 B2(p−fig) for all j 2 N . Obviously, (p−figq>) satises (3.1){
(3.3). Applying Lemma 5.1, we know that for all j; ‘ 2 N we have (ei;M)>Bej;N =
(ei;M )>Be‘;N . But then (3.4) follows using the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 5.1. Hence, (p−figq>) 2 CE(A;B).
The conditions in Lemma 5.3 are weaker than the conditions in Lemma 5.2,
because the incentive compatibility constraints of one of the players can be left out.
Note that it follows from Lemma 3.1 that the resulting correlated equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.2 has some obvious extensions for combinations with entire rows or
columns. These can all be proved in a similar manner and are left to the reader.
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